Approved For Release 2001/07/30 : CIA-RDP79-00498A000300100012-4

Review Staff: 76-0038/A 9 January 1976

Memorandum for: Inspector General

Deputy Director for Administration Deputy Director for Operations Deputy Director for Intelligence Deputy Director for Science and

Technology

It is requested that you address the questions submitted by Elliot Maxwell of the SSC staff concerning the Office of the Inspector General. As is often the case with the SSC, they approach these questions in theory without relation to experience or fact and this Gallup Poll is to elicit your random attitudes on the subject.

Please respond fairly soon.

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Chief, Review Staff

Attachment:

Review Staff: 76/0038 dtd 7 Jan 1976

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FRANK CHURCH, IDAHO, CHAIRMAN

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SELECT COMMITTEE TO STUDY GOVERNMENTAL OPERATIONS WITH RESPECT TO INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES

(PURSUANT TO S. RES. 21, 94TH CONGRESS)

WASHINGTON, D.C. 20510

January 7, 1976

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Mr.
Review Staff
Central Intelligence Agency
Langley, Virginia

76-0038

Dear Scott:

Thanks very much for your very helpful suggestions about the letter on the Inspector General's office. As you will see, the letter reflects a number of your suggestions. I chose, however, not to include an extensive description of the office as it now functions, in order to elicit the opinions of the recipients as to the way they would choose to structure it.

I would very much like to speak to you and to Don Chamberlain about the Inspector General's office and will certainly do so before we draft anything about it. The regulations which sent to me, as well as the organizational history of the office of the Inspector General helped me a great deal in understanding the way the office once was, how it now works, and what changes might at least be considered.

I am enclosing seven copies of the questionnaire which I would appreciate your distributing, for their response, to Don Chamberlain, the Deputy Directors, and the Director. One copy is for you.

Once again, thanks for your help.

Very truly yours,

Elliot E. Maxwell

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Enclosures

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ROBERT MORGAN, N.C. GARY HART, COLO.

RICHARD S. SCHWEIKER, PA.

WILLIAM G. MILLER, STAFF DIRECTOR FREDERICK A. O. SCHWARZ, JR., CHIEF COUNSEL CURTIS R. SMOTHERS, MINORITY COUNSEL

Alnited States Senate

STUDY GOVERNMENTAL OPERATIONS WITH RESPECT TO INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES

(FURSUANT TO S. RES. 21, NATH CONGRESS)

WASHINGTON, D.C. 20510

January 7, 1976

Dear Deputy Director Blake:

The Senate Select Committee on Intelligence Activities is in the process of examining the Office of the Inspector General in the Central Intelligence Agency. The Committee would value your thoughts about the work of this important office. For your convenience a series of questions on which the Committee is focusing is en-Please do not feel limited by these questions; they are designed to provoke discussion and dialogue. If you have other thoughts or suggestions, or if you feel other questions should be raised, please do not hesitate to include them in your particular response. (The questions are not, it should be noted, based on a particular organizational structure. They are designed to elicit your views not on how the office is or was organized, but rather on how it could and would function best.)

The Committee would like your response, if at all possible, including any additional comments or suggestions, before January 23, as the Committee must issue its final report by the end of February. In order to insure that the report is thoughtful, thorough and accurate, the Committee needs the help of individuals like yourself.

I can assure you that the Senate Select Committee very much appreciates your assistance,

Sinderely yours

Frank Church

Chairman

Enclosure

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THE OFFICE OF THE INSPECTOR GENERAL

- (1) The Agency is now resuming the component surveys which were discontinued for a period of time in the early 1970's. Do you think the component surveys were valuable? Should they encompass both the examination of records at headquarters and field visits? How frequently should they take place? Should they cover all components or only the most important or the most sensitive? Who should decide and what criteria should be used to determine the timing and focus of such inspections? Should they be supplemented by program audits similar to those conducted by GAO?
- Agency employees arise, should these be referred to the Inspector General or should they be referred immediately to another body such as the Department of Justice without even an initial investigation by the Inspector General's office?

 Do you know of any instances where allegations of improprieties or illegal activities by Agency officers came to the attention of the Inspector General's office which were not investigated by the Inspector General? Should there be a separate Inspector General Staff which would only investigate allegations of improprieties?
- (3) Should the Inspector General have access to all of the material produced by or in the custody of the Agency? If not,

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what limitations should exist? By whom and how should they be imposed?

- (4) Does the Inspector General have sufficient access to the Director? Sufficient influence? Sufficient influence with other officers of the Agency? In your opinion what were the three most important recommendations made by the Inspector General to the Director which were not accepted?
- (5) Should the Inspector General report to the Director of the Central Intelligence Agency, or to an individual or group outside the Agency, such as the DCI, acting in his capacity as Director of Central Intelligence, PFIAB, or the NSC? (In responding you might consider the effect on the integrity of the Inspector General's conclusions, the likelihood that these conclusions and recommendations will be accepted by the head of the Agency, the Inspector General's access to information both from documents and individuals who will be candid and forthcoming, Agency morale, and the possibility that the Inspector General's post will be used for political purposes.)
- (6) Should the DCI be provided with a community-wide inspection staff? How might this be organized? Should there be Deputy Inspectors General in each of the agencies reporting to an Intelligence Community Inspector General? Should an Intelligence Community Inspector General be guaranteed access

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to any and all documents within each intelligence community agency.

- (7) Should the Inspector General be required to send all reports to the CIA's General Counsel? To any other individual or group within the Agency?
- (8) Should the Inspector General supply the same information to the Congress as is supplied to officials of the Executive Branch? If not, what information, if any, should be provided? Periodic and summary reports? Those recommendations which were not accepted by the Executive? Should reports to Congress go only to the oversight committees, or to all committees having appropriate jurisdiction?
- (9) Should the IG come from within the Agency? (In responding you might consider the effect on the soundness of the recommendations, awareness of potential problem areas, the possibility of shared institutional norms, the access to information, the danger of cooptation, the possibility of the office being used for political purposes.) ?
- (10) Should the Inspector General have a fixed term? Should it be filled by Presidential nomination? With senatorial confirmation?
- (11) Where should the Inspector General staff come from?

 From other components on rotation? From outside the Agency?

 Should there be permanent positions in the Inspector General's

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office? Should there be fixed terms for the Inspector General staff?

- (12) What should the Inspector General's relationship be to the audit function? To the equal employment opportunity function? To personnel grievances? To the process of reviewing and issuing regulations?
- (13) By what methods should the Inspector General's office be evaluated? Would providing its reports to outside bodies suffice? Should another unit, such as the GAO or the internal inspection staff of another intelligence community agency, by charged with the responsibility?
- (14) What do you think were the principal accomplishments of the Inspector General's office? The principal strengths? The principal defects? The principal failures?